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London’s current housing crisis is not unique.  
In the early 1970s some Londoners trying to 
buy property were gazumped by 100%, while 
those trying to rent privately often had to make 
large side-payments even for substandard
accommodation. And there are other cities 
today where prices are increasingly out of line 
with incomes ̶ in central Sydney for example, 
the median house price is over A$1m, higher 
than in London. In fact, in almost all major cities 
there are headlines about housing crises.
  
In part it’s because housing has become an
internationally traded asset and investors 
facing macro-economic instability in their own 
countries consider real estate in places like 
London to be a secure investment. Low interest 
rates make borrowing easier (for some; others 
are excluded from the credit market). But this 
increase in demand has not been met by a 
corresponding growth in supply, as the global 
financial crisis saw new housing investment 
grind to a halt in most industrialised countries.  
In most it has yet fully to recover. Almost
everywhere, worsening income distributions 
mean poorer households struggle to find
adequate accommodation they can afford.
  
So what is special about London’s crisis?
In one sense, nothing: the capital has a growing 
economy and an expanding population whose 
increasing demand for housing generates 
higher prices and rents. To that extent London 
is like many other cities. But the fundamental 
problem is that for decades housing supply 
has not expanded sufficiently in the face of 
growing demand. The UK housing system 
over-responds to economic downturns so 
housing investment is cut back rapidly, while 
it under-responds to increasing demand. As 
a result in each economic cycle there has 
been less housing investment than in the 
preceding one. Even during a decade-long 
period of growth, from the mid-1990s to 2007, 
at most 30,000 new homes per annum were 
built – far below the numbers needed to house 
the growing population of London.
Since the financial crisis the situation has
worsened. Output is only now reaching around 
20,000 per annum, even though the population 
continues to grow rapidly and income growth 
is projected to accelerate, putting massive 
upward pressure on demand. If the future is 
like the past the only thing that can ease the 
problems of the housing market in London is 
recession!
The future has to be different. We need more 
than short-term measures that suddenly
expand supply, welcome as these would be.  
We need to change the fundamentals in order 
to make the housing system more robust to 
economic cycles and generate far higher levels 
of investment not only in London but also in the 
greater South East.
In decades past, government supply subsidies 
supported construction of large amounts of 
social housing. These homes were often directly 
commissioned by local authorities and built 
on their land. In effect this created a separate 
supply chain that provided housing for
particular groups of households. This system 
has been increasingly replaced by a more
market-led approach. Now housing associations 
must purchase land or buildings on the open 
market with less and less help from government 
capital grants, and private developers produce 
a high proportion of new affordable housing 
under planning agreements. This framework is 
unlikely to change, except that more public land 
could be used.
We now need to house four generations, and 
this is a very big ask for the housing market. 
How can the development process be improved 
so that demand for additional housing is met 
more effectively through new investment?
The Issues
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Housing in London: Addressing the Supply
Crisis was a year-long knowledge exchange 
project series which aimed to explore that 
question with key housing stakeholders around 
the capital. Researchers from LSE London, 
a research centre at the London School of 
Economics, organised a series of roundtable 
workshops, site visits, and conference-style 
events with these local experts around four key 
themes:
a)  New Housing and the London Plan
b)  Improving Private Renting
c)  Alternative Housing
d)  The Role of Foreign Money
This report presents the key lessons learned 
from this knowledge exchange. It aimed first to
1This includes a study of housing opportunities and mobility for young professionals in London; a pilot study on the local impact of new 
residential development in the capital city; a report on the conditions and impacts of international investment in London’s housing market; 
research on the private rented sector ranging from the effects of landlord licensing in local authorities, rent stabilization and principles for 
affordability to the experience of private renting for middle-income families; and a long-term ethnographic study of the development of 
cohousing and other alternative forms of construction.
For details of these and other publications, see: http://www.lse.ac.uk/geographyAndEnvironment/research/london/research.aspx
The Barriers  
identify barriers to effective development, then 
to put forward recommendations for overcoming
them, making supply more responsive and 
leading to a step change in output levels. 
Through the debate and analysis that formed 
the core of the project we identified three types 
of challenges: institutional, procedural and
fundamental resource issues. Our related 
research1 added depth to our understanding of 
these major concerns.
Table 1 identifies the most important issues.  
Few will come as a surprise. But lying behind 
the individual issues are some fundamental,
and interlinked, concerns. In the push to 
increase supply through individual initiatives, 
politicians and professionals can miss these 
underlying connections.
• Planned development either never 
happens or takes a long time
• Political objections to development may 
accurately reflect voter preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
• Developable land is in multiple ownership
• Developers too conservative in their
• applications
• Securing planning permission is costly in 
terms of resources and time 
• Uncertainty about planning obligations 
increases risk 
 
• Land does not come forward
• Land is inefficiently developed 
• Infrastructure is not in place 
• Construction industry lacks capacity
• Finance is unavailable
• Housing produced is unaffordable 
• Staff and resource shortages in planning 
departments
• Lack of institutional memory within local 
authorities 
• Limited partnership working between 
boroughs
• Nimbyism
• Emphasis on trading rather than 
production of housing 
• Individual determination of planning 
obligations on each site 
• Protracted and costly viability 
negotiations
• Asymmetry of expertise between 
developers and local authorities
• Difficulties in land assembly when 
ownership pattern is complex  
• High land values lead to expectations of 
continued increases
• Planning densities too low in some areas
• Land supply constraints
• Construction market excludes smaller 
companies
• Lenders reluctant to provide 
development finance, especially to SMEs
Challenges      The Issues       Main Barriers           
Institutional
Challenges
Procedural
Challenges
Fundamental 
Resource
Challenges
Table 1 Fundamental Challenges Impacting Supply
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These need to be recognised if we hope
genuinely to transform the market. They are: 
Mistrust and misunderstanding: Different 
stakeholders have very different views on 
each of these issues. They also have firm 
opinions about where other stakeholders 
are coming from. However these
assumptions are rarely voiced explicitly, and 
stakeholders often blame each other for 
problems which could be dealt with effectively 
in partnership;
Mismatched incentives and objectives: 
Incentives for stakeholders need to be far 
more closely matched to those objectives 
which cannot be changed. Private developers
must maximise profits; local authorities 
need to earn revenue as well as please their 
voters; governments and their agencies 
are looking for value for money. We need to 
make it worthwhile for local authorities to 
support innovation, infrastructure providers 
to address bottlenecks and developers to 
speed up construction in a coherent rather 
than a piecemeal fashion;
Misalignment of policies: Policies tend to 
be issue-specific, but a more overarching 
approach is needed. Addressing a single 
barrier without taking account of how it
interacts with others can make things 
worse. In particular reducing the constraints 
on demand without having the potential 
to expand supply will simply increase land 
values and further benefit land owners and 
traders at the expense of production;
Missing or weak institutions: In many 
countries a strategic level of government 
that determines overall priorities addresses 
these issues. The GLA does this in London 
although with relatively limited powers, but 
in the greater South East there is no
analogous institution;
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
A misguided approach to regulation: 
Most of the problems come down to land 
and the system by which it is developed or 
redeveloped. The UK system is based on 
nationalised development rights and
individual site-specific planning permission
(often involving multiple applications followed 
by appeals). It has led to an adversarial, 
costly and time-consuming process.
Advocates call it flexible, but in fact it does 
not easily allow for adjustment to changing 
circumstances;
A mis-structured development sector: 
The lack of innovation and flexibility in the 
construction industry is in part an outcome 
of the nature of the planning system but it 
is also strongly related to the volatility of the 
macro economy and the impact of macro 
stabilisation policies.
If we accept that these issues do matter, we 
need to decide how we can address them at 
borough and London levels. We need policies 
and regulatory and market changes that act 
with rather than against one another.
The following sections examine ways forward in 
four areas – land use planning and
development; the potential for new private 
renting; additional alternative housing; and the 
role international money can play in supporting 
supply – before moving on to discuss particular 
cross cutting issues and policy
recommendations. 
(v)
(vi)
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New Housing and the London Plan 
It would be easy to blame the current housing
crisis on an overly burdensome planning 
system or greedy land-banking developers. 
Our research indicates that neither of these 
singly tells the story. Accelerating housing 
production can take place within the current 
system but improvements in increasing land 
availability, improving clarity and transparency, 
providing leadership that encourages actors to 
work together and the introduction of financial 
mechanisms at the local authority level that 
can fund new development could significantly 
boost supply.
Taking for example the ‘artificial scarcity of land’ 
― we would argue that a review of greenbelt 
regulations, which would allow for a managed 
release of developable land near transport 
hubs, would be politically contentious but
appropriate. Additionally, addressing land 
banking through measures like Housing Zones 
show real promise as they allow local authorities 
to assemble brownfield land, minimise or
eliminate planning restrictions within the area
and forge partnerships with developers and
housing businesses to deliver substantial
volumes of units. 
Related to this issue of land availability, there 
is a need for more clarity and transparency 
concerning public sector land holdings and the 
status of land in the planning pipeline. The
London Land Commission could be a potentially 
positive step in the land supply equation.
Clarity and transparency are also called for in 
negotiations centred on viability and affordable 
housing targets. Both planners and developers 
are concerned with complexity of negotiating 
the ‘soft’ elements of planning permissions like 
affordability and density.
Finally, authorities could play a larger role in 
financing new construction by establishing 
revolving infrastructure funds. Because of 
soon-to-be-implemented changes to the
governance of local pension funds, members 
could soon have the chance to challenge 
pension funds to invest a modest proportion of 
their potential investment in residential property. 
It is evident that there is little desire or need for 
major reform of the planning system.
Nevertheless, we have found from discussions 
with planners, developers and other key
stakeholders that there are some concrete 
changes related to planning that could accelerate 
the production of new housing supply. Local 
authorities should play more of an enabling, 
driving role in the development of new housing, 
which should include:
actively making more land available for
development, 
improving clarity and transparency, 
providing leadership which incentivises and 
encouraging developers and other actors 
to work together (particularly by identifying 
strategic growth areas such as Housing 
Zones), and 
introducing financial mechanisms at the 
local authority level which can fund new 
development. 
However, austerity means that it is increasingly 
difficult for councils to provide these services 
effectively.
One area these changes must address is the 
‘artificial scarcity of land’ as it is described in 
the Lyons Review. There are a variety of
suggestions related to the fact that land is
constrained as a result of greenbelt and historic
conservation regulation. For authors like Paul 
Cheshire2 the reasonable thing to do is to
strategically release greenbelt land and relax
planning regulations in London around
sightlines and conservation more generally to 
produce taller buildings. Reviewing green belt 
regulations in London in a carefully managed 
way appears on balance a very reasonable 
measure, albeit a politically contentious one. 
One specific reason for stressing this approach 
is that unless London positively addresses land 
shortages within its borders it will be harder 
to try to persuade authorities in the rest of the 
South East to play their part. London cannot
a)
b)
c)
d)
2 See: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/greenbelt-myth-is-the-driving-force-behind-housing-crisis/ 
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We view the London Land Commission, which is 
helping to identify public sector brownfield land, 
as a positive step in the land supply equation.  
In addition, we could envisage a system that 
showed land price data and ownership
(including options) as a good mechanism for 
bringing more developers into the game
because of better data. However, given the 
track record with previous large IT data
information projects there could be major
obstacles to be overcome.
Perhaps one of the most important planning 
concerns centres on viability and affordable 
housing targets. There is a lot of consternation 
out there on both sides (planners and
developers) about how hard it is to navigate the 
planning system when the rules (affordability
targets, density, etc.) are seen as negotiable 
elements of planning. This leads to people 
basing their bid price for land on an assumption 
that they can get more out of planning than 
the rules might allow – thus driving up price. A 
transparent set of numbers (affordable units/
density) that were fixed could aid considerably
here. However, no one should take lightly the 
difficulties around setting these numbers. One 
of the Lyons Review’s key recommendations 
was that guidance should be produced to 
‘ensure a single and robust methodology for 
viability assessment to reduce the scope for 
different interpretations of viability and reduce
and never has been able to provide for growing 
housing needs entirely within its borders and 
population growth in the South East far exceeds 
current expectations of new supply.
Land banking forms the second part of the
‘artificial scarcity story’. Here things like Housing 
Zones show real promise in the ability to bring 
more land to market by giving local authorities 
the power to identify and assemble brownfield 
land, minimise or eliminate planning restrictions 
within the area and forge partnerships with 
developers and housing businesses to deliver 
substantial volumes of units. The key here is 
helping to facilitate land assembly and then 
bring development forward.
Modification/clarification around Compulsory 
Purchase Orders is a big part of this.  There 
seems to be some real reticence to use CPO, 
even when justified, due to questions around its 
legalities. The compensation rules for CPOs for 
large scale sites should be reformed to ensure 
that landowners are offered a generous benefit 
from the sale of the land while ensuring that 
the uplift in land value as a result of planning 
and development can be captured to fund the 
infrastructure required.
Related to this issue of land availability, there 
is a need for more clarity and transparency 
concerning public sector land holdings and the 
status of land in the planning pipeline.
Project site visit, Tower Hamlets
Project site visit, Tower Hamlets
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3 See: The Lyons Housing Review: Mobilising across the nation to build the homes our children need. (2014: 76). 
4 See: The Elphike-House Report. From statutory provider to Housing Delivery Enabler: Review into the local authority role in housing supply. 
Department for Communities and Local Government.
uncertainty’3. But more than that is needed to 
remove the circularity in current interpretations 
by which those who were overoptimistic when 
buying land can offset that stupidity by reducing
obligations on viability grounds.
Finally, authorities could play a larger role in 
financing new construction by establishing 
revolving infrastructure funds. Because of 
soon-to-be-implemented changes to the
governance of local pension funds, members 
could soon have the chance to challenge 
pension funds to invest a modest proportion 
of their potential investment in residential 
property. The Elphicke review4  argues that an 
investment of 3% could lever in up to £5 billion 
investment for housing. Revolving infrastructure 
funds specifically offer a way of pooling central 
and local funding to target priorities in a
contextually sensitive way and allow for the 
initial outlay to be recouped over time. Our 
discussions with local authorities like Croydon 
have already revealed cases where these funds 
are being used to unlock developable land.
• Promote more Housing Zones areas where 
local authorities identify and assemble 
brownfield land, simplify planning restrictions 
within the area and forge partnerships with 
developers and housing businesses to 
deliver substantial volumes of housing units 
• Strategically release greenbelt land in a 
carefully managed way 
• Clarify and modify CPO powers and 
procedures, particularly the right of local 
authorities to use them if needed to assemble 
land for Housing Zone-type development; 
reform the compensation rules for CPOs for 
large scale sites to ensure that landowners 
are offered a generous return from the sale 
of the land while ensuring that the uplift in 
land value as a result of planning and 
development can be captured to fund the 
infrastructure required 
• Examine the possibility of setting transparent  
and consistent targets for affordable housing 
and local infrastructure that are fixed to 
reduce the costs and time of extensive 
negotiations between planning departments 
and developers 
Key Recommendations:
Project site visit, Tower Hamlets
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Dedicating some blocks or sections of big sites 
to PRS use could help accelerate residential 
development in London. A few large builders 
account for most of the capital’s new housing.  
They tend to ‘drip feed’ new homes onto the 
market rather than releasing large chunks of 
stock. This helps cash flow (income from the 
sale of early units helps finance later ones); 
facilitates sequencing of construction tasks; 
and keeps the market from being flooded with 
identical units. Even on sites that will eventually 
have thousands of homes, developers usually 
sell only a few hundred a year.
Producing entire blocks for sale to large
landlords would let developers build faster and 
bring in cash, but should not affect sales to 
owner-occupiers. So why aren’t they doing this 
already? Two main reasons: First, bulk lots of 
PRS housing sell for less per unit than individual 
for-sale dwellings. This is partly because big 
purchasers want volume discounts, but also
Improving Private Renting
because their valuations are based on projected 
rental yield, which gives lower prices than other 
buyers will pay. Second, there are few potential
buyers, although pioneers have started to 
emerge (e.g. QDD at East Village or Genesis 
and M&G at Stratford Halo). While developers 
could act as landlords themselves, and a few 
have done so, most want to sell in order to 
generate income.
What could be done?
Initiatives designed to stimulate new dedicated 
PRS construction include the government’s 
Build to Rent fund and the Mayor’s Housing 
Zones. Here the planning system can support 
PRS-specific construction if the developer 
makes a commitment that the housing will be 
rented for a defined period. We support this 
‘covenanted’ PRS model, as long as it does not 
lead to reductions in the overall amount of new 
affordable housing. 
Potential role of PRS in new supply
Most new residential development in London 
is carried out by a small number of large house 
builders. These developers follow a tested 
model of ‘drip feeding’ new housing onto the 
market, rather than releasing large chunks of 
stock at the same time. This is for three reasons: 
it helps cash flow (because income from the
sale of early units helps finance the construction 
of later ones); it facilitates the sequencing of 
construction tasks; and it ensures that the 
market is not flooded with identical units, which 
would depress prices. Even on sites that will 
eventually accommodate thousands of homes, 
development for sale proceeds at a rate of a 
few hundred units a year at most.
The targeting of some blocks or sections of big 
sites for PRS use could help accelerate
development, as policy makers have recognised. 
In effect, this would revive the model of large 
PRS-only blocks last seen in London in the 
1930s. This is because PRS blocks and
owner-occupied units are essentially two
separate markets. Producing entire blocks for
sale to large landlords would allow for much 
faster build rates, would bring in cash, and 
would not affect sales to owner-occupiers.
However, this is not straightforward. The
English planning system makes no distinction
between owner-occupied and rented
housing. Residential development is a single 
category, and owners of private dwellings are 
free to occupy them or rent them to others 
(although they may be required to register as 
landlords in a minority of local authorities). 
This means that there is no permanent stock 
of private rented housing, as any dwelling may 
switch from one tenure to another at any time.  
On the other hand, it also means there is
nothing to stop developers from producing 
tranches of housing specifically for the PRS.
Why aren’t they doing so already, if PRS has 
such evident benefits?  There are two main
reasons.  First, lots of PRS housing sell for less 
per unit than individual owner-occupied
dwellings. This is partly because purchasers 
expect volume discounts, but more importantly 
because the amount they will offer is based on
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projected rental yield, which results in lower 
prices than owner-occupiers are willing to pay. 
This means PRS blocks are not as profitable for 
developers:  the price of land (which in London
makes up the majority of the cost of a new 
dwelling) is a function of the most profitable 
use of that land. If PRS-specific housing is to 
be an attractive product from the developer’s 
point of view, the cost of land needs to come 
down. Second, there is not yet a critical mass 
of potential buyers for this sort of housing,
although pioneers have started to emerge (e.g. 
QDD at East Village, Genesis and M&G at
Stratford Halo). While developers can retain 
ownership and act as landlords themselves, 
and a few have indeed done so, most would 
prefer to sell in order to generate income.
What could be done?
There are already several initiatives designed 
to stimulate new dedicated PRS construction.  
These include the government’s Build to Rent 
fund and the Mayor’s Housing Zones, where the 
planning system may be used to support PRS 
in return for a commitment that the housing
will remain in tenure for a defined period.  
These are positive steps and we would support 
in particular the extension of the covenanted 
PRS model, as long as this does not involve 
reductions in the amount of affordable housing 
achieved.
• Greater involvement of large landowners, 
especially from the public sector. Given 
current relative returns and funding 
constraints, making private renting stack up 
often requires a land owner who is prepared 
to take an equity stake and/or is willing to 
defer receipt of payment until after the 
development is complete. This might be a 
public-sector owner such as a local authority 
or NHS trust; equally it might be a major 
private-sector employer. An equity stake, 
which could include deferred payment for 
land, is one way of addressing the 
requirement that local authority assets 
be sold into the ‘highest and best use’, 
and could in principle be combined with a 
covenant. Even if the ‘highest and best use’ 
requirement is met, a public owner will only 
allow land to be used for new private rented 
housing if it accepts that private renting is 
a necessary and desirable element in local 
housing provision, which should be reflected 
in clear identification in local needs 
assessments.  
• The July budget contained unexpected 
changes to the tax treatment of small 
landlords. Private individuals and couples 
own the bulk of the sector and will continue 
to do so, even if institutional investment 
increases dramatically. It was announced 
that non-company landlords would no 
longer be able to deduct mortgage interest 
payments from rental income at the higher 
or additional rate of tax. From April 2017, 
deductibility will be capped at 20%. This 
amounts to a major tax increase that will 
particularly affect more ‘professional’ 
landlords, as they are likely to have several 
properties and to be leveraged. Indeed, 
some landlords will be required to pay more 
than their net rental income in tax under the 
new scheme, and there are already anecdotal 
reports of landlords looking to sell up. This 
new tax works against the professionalisation 
of the sector and we recommend that it be 
reconsidered. 
Key Recommendations:
Project site visit, East Village London
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Alternative housing and forms of living are 
increasingly sought in response to economic, 
social and environmental characteristics of the 
traditional homebuilding and ownership models.
Meeting this growing demand requires that 
there be a shift in people’s views of what is 
possible. Knowledge about the process of
designing and producing innovative housing
has to be spread within and across local 
authorities and to a wider consumer and local 
enabler and regulator base. This may involve 
building mechanisms for institutional memory 
within and across local authorities, providing 
supporting tools for groups to be more
commercially-minded and competitive as well as 
drawing on individuals, groups and communities 
with experience of success.
A key impasse to scaling up alternative housing 
is London’s high cost of land. Whether they are 
experimental lifestyle choices motivated by a 
collaborative ethos, or material and technological 
innovations that can improve the form, quality or 
future sustainability- land prices make the
Alternative Housing
financing of such schemes especially 
problematic and costly, particularly for
non-traditional developers. The decline of small 
and medium-size builders exacerbates this 
situation. To surpass such constraints,
socially-oriented landowners need to be more 
engaged, existing local and national initiatives
that support alternative efforts must be identified 
and tapped into and the communal,
neighborhood and other values of alternative 
schemes should be included into traditional 
financial valuations of public land.
Other suggested ways to deal with financing 
are to: (a) use local authority revolving funds; 
(b) encourage local authorities to set up 
mechanisms that channels private funds into 
infrastructure and development, enabling them 
to free up land faster; (c) intensify density to 
reduce per-unit development costs; (d) make 
serviced self-build plots on council-owned land 
available; (e) modify rules to make mortgages for 
alternative developments of different kinds easier 
to access; and (f) change the mono-functional 
planning and land-use classification system.
Relevance of alternative housing as 
additional supply
There is a growing tendency to develop
alternative housing models in London. Our
project defined ‘alternative’ in two ways: as
experimental schemes that respond to
intentional lifestyle choices, where residents 
are motivated by a commitment to community-
driven, participative or self-managed forms 
of housing (e.g., co-housing and some kinds 
of self-build); and as a range of material and 
technological innovations that can improve the 
form, quality and future sustainability of supply 
(e.g, Y:Cube, prefabricated ‘flat-pack’ housing). 
Supporting the development of both of these 
kinds of alternatives would provide additional
housing options to the typical and limited offer, 
paying attention to the diverse needs and
desires of the city’s population, with its changing
demographics. Despite the variety of existing 
schemes across the capital, their ‘niche’ status 
means they face similar issues that need to be
addressed if they are to move more firmly into 
the traditional housing market. 
Barriers identified
Land: The high cost of land in London makes 
the scaling up of any kind of alternative housing
― whether experimental lifestyle choices
motivated by a collaborative ethos, or material 
and technological innovations that can improve 
the form, its quality or future sustainability ― 
extremely difficult. The following is a list of the 
potential ways to address this key impasse:
(a) engage landowners interested in social as 
well as financial returns (e.g., churches, local
authorities and housing associations);
(b) incorporate the communal, neighbourhood 
and other values of alternative schemes into
traditional financial valuations of public land, 
and think of ways to involve lay people and 
future residents; (c) support existing ideas like 
the identification and setting aside of land in 
central and outer London, garden cities and
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• Encourage more land to be made available 
for alternative housing development by: 
engaging landowners interested in social 
as well as financial returns (e.g. churches, 
local authorities and housing associations); 
setting aside land for alternative housing 
forms within Housing Zones and large-scale 
masterplans and encouraging local 
authorities to establish funding mechanisms 
(like Revolving Infrastructure Funds) which 
channel private funds into infrastructure 
and investment, enabling more land to be 
brought forward more quickly. 
• Foster avenues of London-wide knowledge 
exchange: (a) within and between local 
authorities on how best to support alternative 
housing development, and (b) between 
community groups and other relevant 
specialist stakeholders to improve skills and 
find capital.
Key Recommendations:
Home Zones for community self-build initiatives; 
as well as releasing of land through Community 
Land Auctions.
Finance: London’s land constraints make the 
financing of alternative housing schemes diffi-
cult and costly, particularly for non-traditional 
developers. The decline of small and medium 
size builders exacerbates this situation.
Suggested ways to deal with this are to: (a) use
local authority revolving funds; (b) encourage
local authorities to set up mechanisms that 
channels private funds into infrastructure and 
development, enabling them to free up land 
faster; (c) intensify density to reduce per-unit 
development costs; (d) make serviced
self-build plots on council-owned land available;
(e) modify rules to make mortgages for alterna-
tive developments of different kinds easier to 
access; and (f) change the mono-functional
planning and land-use classification system, 
which requires (for taxation purposes) a
distinction between live and work.
Knowledge: To get politicians on board as well 
as to shift people’s views of what is possible, 
knowledge about the process of designing and 
producing innovative housing has to be spread 
within and across local authorities and to a
wider consumer and local enabler/regulator 
base. Negative preconceptions around less 
mainstream models like those that use prefab
technology must also be overcome in order to 
appeal to the wider population, while
recognising that factors like location, amenities,
neighbourhood, and aesthetics can matter 
significantly more to some households than 
housing typology. This may involve: (a) building 
mechanisms for institutional memory, including 
local publicly available databases of relevant
information; (b) setting up a cross-London 
forum of exchange that allows for networks 
to develop and information to be exchanged, 
increasing future opportunities and speed;
(c) encouraging local authorities to play a more 
active role in promoting alternative developments;
(d) providing supporting tools for groups to be 
more commercially-minded and competitive; 
and (e) drawing and building on individuals, 
groups and communities with experience of 
successful development of alternative housing 
forms (including the importance of accounting 
for long-term affordability and robust social
infrastructure into design) and finding ways to 
pass on their knowledge. 
Walter Segal method
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The Role of Foreign Money 
International money is seen as politically toxic 
― yet it is helping to accelerate large new
developments in London, which include a variety 
of market and affordable housing.
The main political concerns are not about supply
but with the (often overstated) fear that foreign 
buyers outbid Londoners only to leave the units 
vacant. Moreover, international buyers are often 
looking for flats in new apartment buildings of 
the sort which are now being developed ― 
making it feel like a separate market place.
There are however many positive aspects of 
international involvement in supply. It brings in 
new equity from people prepared to take a
longer view both in terms of development and 
the ownership of professionally managed private
rented accommodation. New players can bring 
in different skills and a very much more positive 
approach to the speed at which development 
should take place ― with the potential to build 
out large development sites much more quickly.
If they are to provide these benefits, investors 
are looking for greater certainty ― about the 
planning process, about negotiations for
infrastructure and affordable homes, about the 
tax regime and regulation of the private rented 
sector. Equally Londoners need to know that 
what is being provided is additional. So we 
require evidence on vacancies; on additional 
development funding; on speeding up
development on particular sites; on the different 
patterns of returns required; and on how
international money can be combined with 
more traditional forms of funding to accelerate 
the whole range of development opportunities.
International money is not directly aimed at 
addressing the affordability problem.  Even so 
if it can provide significant additional finance, 
additional skills and most additional housing ― 
and it appears that it can ― it has an important 
and continuing role in providing more homes 
for Londoners.
International money is politically toxic ― yet it is 
helping to accelerate large new developments 
in London, which include a variety of market 
and affordable housing. It kept the central
London market moving in the post crisis era 
and is prepared to put in equity, which is looking
for longer term returns ― a very different model 
from the traditional debt financing pro-cyclical 
UK approach to development observed in the 
past. All of this is good.
Much of the demand from international buyers 
is for new apartment buildings of the sort which 
is now being developed so, the match between
building and demand is very close ― making it 
feel like a separate market place from which
locals are being excluded. Yet the main demands 
are as permanent residences or for buy to let 
properties, which are then rented out in the 
general market. The problem is that this
housing is filling a gap in the London ‘world city’ 
market but not obviously impacting directly 
on the overall shortage issue (especially given 
continued in-migration).
The most important positive aspects are: it 
brings in new equity from people prepared to 
take a longer view (not just QDD style where 
the money comes in to purchase when units 
are complete but also equity funding for
development). This can bring with it new
management skills, which help build the new 
style large developments where delivery is 
speeded up. Can these benefits be transferred 
to other more mainstream types of development 
especially outside central London?
Ideally London also wants to attract more
traditional types of international finance like 
pension funds which are looking for private 
renting ― but again this will normally be at the 
upper end of the scale and could, if we are not 
careful, directly reduce the amount of affordable 
housing that will be provided.
International money is also looking for certainty
― about regulation, about the tax regime and 
about how local authorities treat them. As
landlords many would probably not mind a
longer lease term with rents indexed within that
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term as long as it was absolutely clear what 
the terms and conditions were. They clearly do 
not want incremental changes in tax apparently 
directed at them because of political pressure. 
They would like tariffs rather than negotiation 
with respect to affordable housing and local 
infrastructure. Important here is that many of 
these ‘requests’ would also be made by domestic 
institutional funders as well as developers.
International money is only a part of the answer 
― and the outcomes need clearly to be seen to 
be additional and not wasted through vacancy. 
So we need evidence on vacancies; evidence
on additional funding for development itself; 
evidence on speeding up development on 
particular sites; evidence on different patterns 
of returns required; and evidence on how it can 
help bring in and interrelate with more traditional 
forms of funding to accelerate the whole range 
of development opportunities.
International money is currently a requirement 
for developing large sites ― and can play a core 
role in making the step change to sustaining 
much higher output levels. But into the longer 
term, domestic demand and domestic money 
are also absolutely necessary to ensure high 
and stable levels of housing investment.
Even though international money is not directly 
aimed at addressing the affordability problem, 
if it can provide significant additional finance, 
additional skills and most importantly additional 
housing ― and it appears that it can ― it has an 
important and continuing role in providing more 
homes for Londoners.
• International money is to be welcomed IF it 
adds to the stock and encourages more 
efficient production methods and  
management ― we need to improve the 
evidence base on the impact of international 
money on speeding up development 
• Encourage stability in the planning and 
regulatory regimes ― not political fiddling for 
the sake of it 
• Examine the potential mechanisms for 
increasing certainty with respect to individual 
planning permissions 
• Clarify the position on rent/security regulation 
as soon as possible after the mayoral election 
• Support the GLA and local authorities in local 
master planning and partnership approaches 
including international investors
Key Recommendations:
Project site visit, East London view
Project site visit, East Village London
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Cross Cutting Issues   
Greenwich Peninsula new development
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with its own mission and approach. Equally, 
boroughs’ very different stances on planning 
and allocation make it difficult for associations. 
The great variety of objectives among both 
housing associations and local authorities 
is one of the major reasons why partnership 
working is more difficult than it might appear on 
paper. And the current government’s policies 
on housing association rents, welfare changes 
and the Right to Buy all can restrict housing 
associations’ capacities. Even so, they are and 
will remain major players in accelerating
development.
Another factor limiting capacity is the
construction industry’s focus on speculative 
development. Most developers ‘build to the 
market’, meaning that it takes a long time to 
build out large sites ― even if several developers
are involved and the mix of dwellings allows 
them to reach different markets. This approach 
also makes it difficult to use off-site construction
methods, as it does not generate sufficient 
scale. But some developers are now making 
greater use of contracted design, and
companies (often from overseas) with a
different approach to build-out rates have 
shown that development can proceed more 
rapidly. Some of the examples we have
identified, particularly the development of 
housing suitable for young professionals, show 
considerable potential to increase the rate of 
development. However these new approaches 
depend on both scale and stability in demand 
― something not generally seen in the UK 
context.
London has long attracted overseas buyers for 
its new housing, and is now starting to attract
foreign developers as well, particularly from 
countries with long experience of building rapidly 
to scale. Their approaches to management, 
finance and development speed, and their
experience operating professional private
rented housing can inform the London market.
Their involvement is beginning to generate 
additional supply. Growth depends on building 
effectively on these ‘demonstration’ projects ― 
which in turn depends on breaking many of the 
barriers discussed above.
Expanding Development Capacity   
How can we increase capacity in the 
construction industry?  Four main methods 
have been identified:
bring SMEs back into the mix;
make better use of  housing associations; 
make greater use of contractors as
opposed to partnering with developers 
― including expanding the role of off-site 
construction; and
attract international investors as both
developers and long-term investors in
private renting and mixed tenure schemes.
Around half of all housing construction used to 
be undertaken by SMEs but many were killed 
by the financial crisis. There are three things 
preventing their re-emergence: a dearth of 
small sites coming forward, the costs of getting 
planning permission and a shortage of debt 
finance. Government introduced initiatives to 
make funding easier but take-up has been 
minimal because all three issues need to be 
addressed together. Local authorities need to 
give greater priority to smaller sites; it should 
again be cheap and rapid to secure outline 
planning permission, or authorities should 
provide shovel-ready sites; and government 
should ensure that initiatives like Help to Buy 
and starter homes are actually open to smaller 
builders. Custom built homes are another
important way forward.
Over the last few years the larger, more assertive 
London housing associations have been cross-
subsidising construction of affordable homes 
with income generated by more market oriented
projects, developing both properties for market
rent and for sale. Using a range of models they 
are working in partnership with other
associations (including smaller associations 
who have borrowing capacity) and particularly 
local authorities to speed up development and 
increase output over the next few years.
But increasing the role of housing associations 
is not entirely straightforward. Local authorities 
already complain that they have to deal with too 
many of them ― in some central London 
boroughs there are over 80 associations, each
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
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We have identified an initial set of measures5, 
below, that can improve the chances of success
in expanding housing investment. They
represent the first steps towards major
expansion of capacity.
5 More detailed information about each theme and multi-media outputs from the project (including blogs, videos, podcasts, and an interactive 
map) can be found on our project website, www.lselondonhousing.org.
Make planning more predictable:
• Introduce more Housing Zones ― and 
monitor and modify effectively
• Introduce more transparent and consistent 
targets for affordable housing and 
infrastructure ― move towards tariffs and 
away from negotiation 
• Increase cross-borough networking, 
particularly around strategies for alternative 
housing
• Develop coherent policies on change of use 
through devolved powers to the GLA
Make land more available
• Encourage partnership arrangements 
involving public landowners, local authorities 
and developers 
• Identify defined parcels of accessible green 
belt land that is not necessary for environmental 
sustainability for residential development
• Clarify and improve CPO powers and 
procedures to enable more effective and 
quicker land assembly
• Encourage a leadership role for the GLA and 
the London Land Commission in bringing 
land as far as the construction stage
Speed up processes 
• Increase resources for local authority 
planning departments by more positive 
planning fee structures
• Enable the GLA to provide templates to 
support partnerships and resources for
Recommendations:
over-stretched local authority departments
• Rationalise viability assessments ― again 
requiring GLA devolved powers
• Increase build-out rates by parcelling out 
sites to increase the number of developers 
and encourage a wider range of dwelling 
types
• Ensure more effective planning gain 
‘clawback’ as prices increase, at the same 
time structuring planning gain payments to 
make quicker development more worthwhile
• Encourage public landowners to take an 
equity stake in partnership arrangements 
aimed at ensuring appropriate timing and 
funding infrastructure arrangements 
• Establish more revolving infrastructure funds
Expand construction capacity
• Provide shovel-ready smaller sites for small 
developers
• Restructure government development 
finance programmes to make accessible to 
SMEs (again requires devolved powers) 
• Encourage international developers with 
experience in rapid build-out rates into the 
London market
• Place greater emphasis on commissioning 
in partnership with developers in addition to 
speculative building
• Support housing associations to play a 
larger role in mixed tenure development 
including greater emphasis on intermediate 
tenures
• Identify in far more detail why the largest 
sites are not contributing adequately ― only 
when they do so can output, particularly in 
central London, increase significantly 
Lobby central government 
• To restructure current GLA powers to enable 
a more strategic approach
• To devolve further powers to the GLA
• To make CPO powers more effective 
• To make policy initiatives, notably Help to Buy  
and development finance, more London friendly
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While these measures will help, we need to
recognise that development capacity cannot be
sustainably expanded in an uncertain demand 
environment. The extreme examples of Ireland 
and Spain show that just expanding building 
can unbalance the economy and generate 
large-scale supply overhangs. In this country, 
high production of new homes in the past was 
based on subsidised housing directly
commissioned to meet social rather than market
demand. Now, long-term success depends on 
reducing volatility in the macro economy,
improving the operation of the mortgage market
and introducing a range of more affordable
tenures. The potential for continued acceleration
in development in London therefore depends 
as much on the national economy as it does on 
London specific initiatives.
Three final points: 
The list of recommendations is not one from 
which to pick and choose individual elements
and expect them to be successful. It is a first 
attempt at a coherent set of requirements. It 
needs more work ― and we intend, over the 
next few months, to develop the
1.
recommendations into a coherent agenda 
for the new mayor. 
Many of the recommendations require
initiative from central government in
partnership with the GLA ― achieving a step 
change in development which can be
maintained over economic cycles requires 
both devolution and continued partnership. 
Even taken together, these recommendations 
will not solve the immediate crisis ― prices 
are set to increase further unless there is 
recession or massive political uncertainties. 
There is therefore a strong case for a crisis 
package that builds on the demonstration 
projects we have identified to generate large 
volumes of well managed apartments that 
are suitable for younger households starting 
out on their careers. There are good
examples but they need to be multiplied 
a hundred fold and that requires courage; 
debt financing by local authorities and the 
GLA; and contracted builders who can bring 
in more construction resources. It can be 
done ― but it requires the political will and a 
lot of hard work.  
2. 
3.
Elephant and Castle
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For more information, please visit www.lselondonhousing.org
e-mail: lselondon@lse.ac.uk
Follow us @LSE_London
